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INTRODUCTION
Since at least the work of Mincer (1958) there has been a generally
accepted interpretation of the correlation between earnings and labour
market experience, namely that it reflects the fact that more
experienced workers have larger amounts of general human capital
(possibly, depending on the version of the theory, after current
investments in human capital have been deducted S see Ben-Porath
(1967)).  So deeply engrained is this belief that apparent increases in
the returns to experience observed in the United States (Katz and
Murphy, 1992) and the United Kingdom (Schmitt, 1995) are
interpreted as evidence of an increase in the returns to human capital
and  play an important role in the diagnosis of the cause of the rise in
wage inequality as being a shift in relative labour demand against the
less-skilled.  But, there are few direct tests of the hypothesis for the
simple reason that independent measures of productivity rarely exist.
This would not be a potential problem if the human capital model
was the only plausible explanation for the earnings-experience profile
but it is not.  Burdett (1978) presents a search model in which the
distinctive feature (at the time) was that employed as well as
unemployed workers engaged in job search.  Although it was not the
main subject of his paper, he pointed out that his model predicted that
“older workers... receive higher wages rates, on average, because they
have obtained more job offers and the more job offers a worker
receives, the greater the probability a ‘high’ wage rate job will be
found” (p.219).  Some evidence supportive of this view is to be found
in the literature on the earnings losses suffered by displaced workers
which typically finds that more experienced workers suffer greater wage
losses even after controlling for job tenure (Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson,
Lalonde et al, 1993).  There is one part of the existing literature
2that is worried that estimates of earnings functions might be biassed by
search or ‘job-shopping’. Topel (1986), Abraham and Farber (1987),
Altonji and Shakotko (1987),  Marshall and Zarkin (1987), Topel
(1991) and Altonji and Williams (1992) present different ways of
trying to derive ‘true’ earnings functions.  But this literature is not very
satisfactory as the answers obtained seem very sensitive to the precise
method used and it has concentrated on possible bias in the estimated
returns to tenure when the underlying logic also suggests a potential
problem with the estimated return to experience.
In this paper we take a different approach from that literature.  As
we show below, the shape of the earnings-experience profile predicted
by the search model depends on labour market transition rates: the rate
at which workers move out of employment, into employment and the
rate at which they change jobs. As these transition rates are observable
one can compute the earnings-experience profile predicted by the
search model and compare it with the actual, interpreting the residual
as the part of the profile that can be ascribed to the human capital
explanation (or any other theory that takes one’s fancy).  What we
show, using data from 20 years of the UK General Household Survey
and Labour Force Survey, is that the search model can explain a large
part of the earnings-experience profile for both men and women, that
it can explain all the gap in the profiles between men and women and
that the rise in the returns to experience seems to be the result of a rise
in the returns ascribed to search as much as the residual.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we outline
a simple search model of the labour market and derive the predicted
relationship between earnings and experience.  The second section
describes the British earnings experience profile and the third through
fifth sections then consider how well the model can explain UK data.
Finally, we consider some extensions to the model.
31. THE RETURNS TO EXPERIENCE IN A SIMPLE SEARCH
MODEL
Let us assume that the labour market has a distribution of wage offers
and that firms can be characterised by their position in the wage offer
distribution which we will denote by F.  We are deliberately vague
about the origin of this wage distribution e.g. one could justify it using
a model of equilibrium wage dispersion along the lines of Burdett and
Mortensen (1989) or a model of rent-sharing in the presence of
employer heterogeneity along the lines of Pissarides (1994).  But what
is important is that there is a wage distribution facing a given worker.
In the interests of simplicity we assume that jobs never change their
position in the wage offer distribution.  One can think of the wage
offered by a job at position F in the wage distribution  as being given
by w(F,a) where a is the labour market experience of the worker1.  In
a pure search model where there is no ‘true’ return to labour market
experience the function w(F,a) will be independent of a.  
A couple of points are in order here.  First, we will follow the
bulk of the empirical literature in measuring a as potential labour
market experience i.e. age minus age when left full-time education.
Both the human capital and the search models would suggest that
‘true’ labour market experience would provide more explanatory
power: we do not pursue this here as our data sets (in common with
most others available to researchers) do not contain such information2.
Second, we will refer to the dependence of w(F,a) on a as the ‘true’
returns to experience with the implication that they represent the
returns to general human capital.  But it should be remembered that
there is no direct evidence for this and there are other stories one could
tell based on incentives and monopsonistic discrimination that could
also explain why firms make wage offers that depend on experience.
Individuals are assumed to enter the labour market at experience
0 and they exit the labour market at a rate dr(a).  We assume that
unemployed individuals of experience a receive job offers at a rate
?u(a), and employed workers at a rate ?e(a) and that all job offers are
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drawn at random from the wage offer distribution.  We assume that all
job offers are acceptable to the unemployed (assuming heterogeneity
in reservation wages would make matters more realistic but much more
complicated) but that employed workers only accept a new job offer if
it is from a firm that is at a position in the wage distribution above the
position of their current firm.  This means that the rate at which
workers in a firm at position F leave for other firms is given by ?e(a)(1-
F).  We also assume that workers leave employment for unemployment
at a rate du(a).  Because of the existence of on-the-job search the
distribution of wages among workers will differ from the distribution of
wage offers so let us denote by G(F,a) the fraction of workers of
experience a who are employed in firms at position F or lower in the
wage offer distribution.
To close the model, we need to make some assumption about
labour market entrants.  From the theoretical point of view perhaps the
easiest assumption is to assume that these workers all initially enter
unemployment so that u(0)=1 in which case we will have G(F,0)=F (G
should be interpreted as a limit in this case).  But, in practice not all
labour market entrants are unemployed because of job search before
they enter the labour market so that we treat u(0) as exogenously given.
However, we maintain the assumption that G(F,0)=F so that the
distribution of wages among labour market entrants is the wage offer
distribution.  The justification for this is that labour market entrants
have had so little time in the labour market that the probability of them
having received more than one wage offer is negligible.  Given this set-
up, let us derive G(F,a) for other experience levels.
It is useful to start with unemployment rates.  Define U(a) to be
the level of unemployment among workers of wage a  and u(a) to be
the unemployment rate among workers of age a.  Obviously
u(a)=[U(a)/L(a)] where L(a) is size of the labour force of age a.  We
must have:
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As the rate at which workers exit unemployment is (?u(a)+dr(a)) and the
rate at which they enter unemployment is du (a), we must have:
Substituting this into (1) leads to;
which simply says that the change in the rate of unemployment is the
difference between inflows and outflows.  One can see from (3) that the
labour market exit rate, dr, plays no role.  As this will continue to be
the case in all the distributions derived below (as it is assumed to be the
same for all workers, irrespective of employment status or wage), to
economize on algebra we will assume it is zero in what follows: this is
without loss of generality.
The following Proposition derives G(F*a).
Proposition 1:  The distribution function of wages conditional on
experience G(F,a) satisfies the following differential equation:
which has as a unique solution:
where:
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Proof: See Appendix A.
One can give a fairly simple intuitive explanation for the differential
equation (4).  The first term on the right-hand side represents the rate
at which currently employed workers receive wage offers which would
take them to a firm with a position above F in the wage offer
distribution.  The second term represents the employees who have
come from unemployment.  The term ?uu/(1-u) is the number of new
entrants relative to the employed. [F-G] represents the difference in the
distribution of wages between the new entrants and the existing
workers. 
Turning to the closed-form analytical solution (5) one can readily
check that G(F*a) is a strictly increasing function of F with G(0*a)=0
and G(1*a)=1 for all a (the last result follows because ß(s)=0 when
F=1).  For a>0 and 0<F<1 one can check by inspection that G(F*a)<F
so that the distribution of workers across firms always strictly
dominates (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) the
distribution of wage offers.   Given our assumption that the distribution
of wages among labour market entrants is equal to the wage offer
distribution this implies that the least experienced workers always do
worse then more experienced workers: as we shall see this is consistent
with the data.  
We might be interested in how the function G(F*a) varies with the
labour market transition rates.  We can prove the following
7Proposition.  
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Proposition 2:
i)
ii)  
Proof: See Appendix A.
What this proposition says is that anything that increases the arrival
rate of job offers when employed will improve the wage distribution of
workers and anything that increases the ratio of new entrants to existing
workers will decrease it.  As we shall see below this result will be of
use in explaining why women have lower returns to experience than
men as the rate at which women enter employment from non-
employment is higher than for men.
So far we have shown that the wage distribution must improve on
entry to the labour market.  But, one might also wonder if one can
prove a stronger result, namely that the wage distribution is monotonic
in experience.  A sufficient (but by no means necessary) condition for
this is provided in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3: If a(a) is non-increasing ß(a) is non-decreasing in a,
9then MG(F*a)/Ma<0 for all 0<F<1 and for all a$0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Put in intuitive terms, this means that we can be sure that the wage
distribution is improving monotonically with experience if the arrival
rate of job offers does not fall with experience and the entrant rate does
not rise.  This Proposition also provides clues for when the
monotonicity might fail.  If women of particular experience levels tend
to leave employment to have children and then re-enter the labour
market at some later date we might expect to see the proportion of
entrants rising for some experience levels and hence we might expect
to see the wage distribution worsening at that time for the reason that
they will tend to re-enter the labour market at low wages. 
One might wonder how well a pure search model can explain the
broad features of the earnings-experience profile.  Burdett (1978)
showed, for a model in which ?u=0 and the job offer arrival rate for the
employed was constant, that the pure search model predicted earnings
to be an increasing, concave function of experience.  We have already
provided a generalisation of the increasing part of this result in the
previous proposition so one might wonder whether one can prove
anything about concavity.  If a and ß are constant then it is simple to
show that the earnings function in the pure search model must be
concave.  But, in general the model does not predict concavity and, as
we shall see, this is very desirable as the empirical earnings profiles are
not everywhere concave.
So, let us now move on to the data.  We will start by simply
looking at some stylized facts about the earnings-experience profile in
the UK.
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2. THE EXPERIENCE EARNINGS PROFILE IN THE UK
The earnings data we will use in this study come from the UK General
Household Survey for 1974S92.  From the point of view of studying
earnings functions, the GHS has one serious disadvantage, namely that
it is not possible to construct a true hourly wage after 1978 because the
questions on overtime hours were discontinued.  Different researchers
have dealt with this problem in different ways.  Some have used only
weekly earnings as their wage measure and, to avoid the problems
caused by the importance of part-time work among women, have
restricted attention to men.  Others have used weekly earnings and
restricted attention to workers who categorize themselves as full-time:
this has the disadvantage of  ignoring part-time women, a group who
are growing in importance.  In this paper we use as our earnings
measure the usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours
excluding overtime i.e. we use an incomplete adjustment for hours.
This may seem rather curious but we will argue that it is the best of a
set of imperfect alternatives for the following reasons.  First, the job
search model suggests that we need a ranking of jobs: while it is
reasonable to assume that all workers prefer, other things equal, jobs
with higher hourly wages, it is not reasonable to think that all workers
prefer jobs with longer hours (85% of part-time workers who are not
sick or students in the 1995 Labour Force Survey say they do not want
a full-time job).  So the hourly wage is likely to give a better indication
of the relative attractiveness of jobs than weekly wages.  The other
justification for the use of this earnings variable is that the bias induced
by ignoring overtime hours seems to be small.  For the years before
1978 when we can compute a ‘true’ hourly wage measure and compare
it with ours, the correlation between the two is 0.975 after taking out
time effects.  The reason for the very close correlation is that overtime
hours are a relatively small fraction of total hours (usual hours average
about 35 hours, overtime hours under 3) and even then the correlation
of overtime hours with hourly earnings is very weak.  Hence, we would
argue that the advantages in being able to include part-time women
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workers and doing some correction to weekly earnings for hours
variation is better than doing no correction at all even though it would
obviously be desirable to have a better hours measure.
Figure 1 presents the earning-experience profile for men and
women in a single year; 1983.  To show that this is a fairly typical year,
Figure 2 presents (on a smaller scale) the profiles for each year.  In this
and all later work, log wages have been adjusted to be on the same
scale by taking out time effects (time being measured by the month)
and normalized so that the earnings of labour market entrants are zero.
There are several features of these profiles worthy of discussion.
First earnings grow rapidly in the years after labour market
entrance and then decline more slowly as is generally drawn.  But  the
quadratic relationship between log earnings and experience that is
commonly estimated is not a good fit to the profile.  A similar point has
been made by Murphy and Welch (1990) for the United States.  They
found that a quartic provided an adequate fit to the data.  If one insists
on fitting a polynomial to the data (and inspection of Figure 1 does not
suggest that this is likely to be a particularly good specification) this
does not seem to be a high enough order for British data; for each year,
one typically finds that powers up to the eighth are statistically
significantly different from zero.  The reason for this difference is that
there do seem to be significant differences in the profile between the
UK and the US.  In the US male earnings seem to peak at around 30
years of experience (a similar finding being reported by Mincer, 1974,
for an earlier period).  In the UK earnings seem to peak somewhat
earlier (at around 15 years of experience for men and 10 for women)
and earnings growth prior to that point is very fast.
The second feature of Figures 1 and 2 worth noting is the
difference between men and women.  On labour market entry the
earnings growth of men and women are very similar but the profiles
diverge as we increase years of experience, though less so in the later
years than the earlier.  In addition, the earnings profile for women
seems to have a ‘bump’ period from 10 to 15 years of experience when
earnings seem to fall very rapidly though this bump is less pronounced
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in later years.  One implication of this is that although the profile is
concave for men over the whole range of experience, it is convex over
part of the range for women.  
These figures do not tell us about the comparison of the level of
wages of men and women on labour market entry (as these are
normalized to zero for both groups).  There was a significant positive
difference in mean earnings between men and women on labour market
entry in 1974S5 (consistent with the fact that the Equal Pay Act only
came fully into force in 1975) but the difference is insignificantly
different from zero after that date and actually slightly negative in the
later years.        
There have also been changes in the returns to experience over
time.  This is rather hard to see from Figure 2, so Figure 3 presents the
earnings for different experience levels relative to labour market
entrants over time.  Because this is all relative to workers of one
experience level we also present in Table 1, average earnings by
grouped experience categories.  From this table one can see the rise in
the earnings of more experienced workers (both male and female)
relative to those with 0S5 years of experiences in about 19843 and also
the rise in female earnings relative to men and the fact that the peak in
women’s earnings now seems to be noticeably later in their labour
market career.
One can summarize these facts as:
i) For men the profile is concave with very rapid earnings growth in
the first years after labour market entry and a gentle decline in the
later years.
ii) For women the profile shows less of an increase than for men and
has a convex portion with a ‘bump’ at around 10S15 years of
experience.
iii) The gap between the male and female profiles has fallen over
time.
iv) There has been a rise in the returns to experience.
Armed with these stylized facts, let us now attempt to evaluate how
13
well they can be explained using the search approach.
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3. EXPLAINING THE EARNINGS-EXPERIENCE PROFILE
The theoretical discussion above has all been in terms of the
distribution of workers of particular experience levels across firms at
different positions in the wage distribution. But if we want to discuss
how well the theoretical model explains the earnings-experience profile
we need to introduce the wages actually paid.  As before we denote by
w(F,a) the log wage paid to a worker of experience a by a firm at
position F in the wage offer distribution.  Given this the expected log
wage will be given by:
From (9) it should be apparent that there are two reasons why earnings
might vary with experience.  First, there are ‘true’ experience effects,
namely that wages offered by firms vary with experience i.e. an effect
through w(F,a) and, secondly, there are the effects associated with job
search i.e. the effects through G(F*a).    There is no reason why the
same approach could not be used to look at other moments or
percentiles and we do consider the variance briefly below.  
The aim of this paper is to try to disentangle the pure experience
effect from the search effect.  The way we will do this is to write (9) as:
where we will interpret the first term as the ‘true’ return to experience
and the second term (which can be interpreted as the average wage
received by workers of experience a if the wage offer distribution
remained the same) is the contribution of search.  If w(F,a)=w(F)+?(a)
then the first term will simply be ?(a): this is the case where the ‘true’
15
return to experience is the same at all points in the wage offer
distribution so that there is a single measure of the ‘true’ return to
experience.  Where w(F,a) does not satisfy this condition the formula
in (10) estimates the ‘true’ return to experience is a weighted average
using the distribution of workers across the wage offer distribution as
weights.
The strategy for the decomposition in (10) is the following.  We
will compute the second term using information on the wage
distribution of labour market entrants4 to estimate w(F,0) as it is our
assumption that G(F*0)=F and estimates of G(F*a) based on labour
market transition rates.  The first term on the right-hand side of (10)
(which we will interpret as the ‘true’ return to experience) will then be
estimated as the residual part of the actual profile not explained by the
search model.  Note that we cannot estimate w(F,a) directly as what we
observe is the distribution of wages across workers not across job
offers5.
At this stage it is worth considering the implications of assuming
(as is commonly done) that the wage distribution depends not just on
(F,a) but also on job tenure.  The important point to note is that this
does not alter the interpretation of the second term in (10) as the wage
one would expect if there were no true returns to experience or tenure.
The reason for this is that labour market entrants must, by definition,
have tenure zero so that the wage distribution used to estimate w(F,0)
can be interpreted as the wage offer distribution for workers with zero
experience and tenure.  However, the interpretation of the residual in
the earnings profile must now be interpreted as the joint effect of
experience and tenure and there is no way to disentangle the two
components (though see Hartog and Teulings, 1996; Manning, 1997,
for such  attempts).
Our estimates of the transition rates are taken from the annual UK
Labour Force Survey conducted in the spring every two years from
1975 to 1983 and annually thereafter.  This contains information on
current labour market status and also a retrospective question on
labour market status a year ago and whether there has been a change
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in employer for those who report being in employment in both years.
Since the start of the panel aspect of the Labour Force Survey in 1992
one can check the accuracy of the retrospective questions: overall it
seems to be of the order of 95%.  So, they seem to be fairly accurate.
We used these questions to estimate the labour market transition
rates for each year of experience in each year.  As the information on
labour market status is only available at discrete points in time and the
model we have presented has been in continuous time there is an issue
of how we infer the underlying transition rates from the data that we
have.  One possibility is to use the predictions of a continuous time
model for the discrete observations to estimate the continuous time
transition rates making some assumption about how the transition rates
vary as experience varies through the year.  For estimating (?u,du) there
is no problem with doing this but matters are more difficult for the
arrival rate of job offers when employed, the reason being that ?e is the
arrival rate of all job offers, not just the arrival rate of better job offers
so that one needs to adjust the rate at which workers change jobs for
the distribution of workers across firms which will itself change through
time.  This adjustment is computationally extremely cumbersome in
continuous time.  So, we adopt a simpler approach and use a
discretized version of the model which is described in Appendix B
where we also describe how we estimate the transition rates.  For (?u,du)
we have worked out the difference between this simple method of
computing transition rates and the rates derived from a model based on
continuos time and the discrepancies are small.  The reason for this is
that the discrete time approximation will be good if a year is a period
of time over which it is rare to have more than one labour market
transition and, while there are some people who have a large number
of moves (and these people are obviously much more important in
statistics based on flows) most people move only rarely.  Evidence from
the British Household Panel Study for the early 1990s suggest under
2.5% of individuals have more than two labour market states in the
course of a year (and this overstates the mobility for our purposes as it
distinguishes between unemployment and inactivity).  Hence the
17
discrete time approximation is likely to be a good one.
Figure 4 presents information on the transition rate from
employment to non-employment  for men and women at different
experience profiles over the years.  The main features of the data are
that male employment to non-employment rates are quite constant over
the life-cycle though were noticeably higher in the early 1980s.  For
women the transition rates in the earlier years show a ‘bump’
associated with having children but, by the early 1990s this has all but
disappeared and the transition rates are very similar to those for men.
Figure 5 presents similar information for the transition rate from non-
employment to employment: this tends to decline with labour market
experience and be higher for women than men though again the
convergence between the sexes over time is very striking.   Finally
Figure 6 presents information on the job-to-job mobility rate: these
seem to always have been very similar for men and women and decline
with experience.  Note that this job mobility rate is not the same thing
as the job offer arrival rate of the model because it is not corrected for
the wage offer distribution.
We used these transition rates and the discrete time version of (4)
(which is given in Appendix B) to compute G(F*a).  In doing this we
are making an implicit steady-state assumption.  In computing the
G(F*a) for a worker with 30-years of experience this year what is
relevant is the transition rate for a worker with 29 years of experience
last year rather than this year.  For some years we obviously do have
this information but the biannual nature of the LFS in the early years
together with the fact that we only have 20 years of data mean that
there would be much information that is missing.  The steady-state
assumption may not be too bad as one can see from Figures 4S6 that
the pattern of transition rates is broadly the same over the sample
period but one should be aware of the potential problems caused by it.
To illustrate the predictions of the model Figure 7 presents
estimates of G(0.5*a) i.e. the proportion of workers of experience a
paid below the median wage for labour market entrants.  As can be
seen the model predicts a decline for men which is very sharp in the
18
first few years after labour market entry and then flattens off and a
‘bump’ for women caused by their tendency to leave paid employment
for domestic reasons.
We now turn to the predictive power of the model.  Figure 8
presents the actual earnings-experience profile compared with the
predicted from the pure search model for women and men (note that
these graphs only show the actual profile in 1976, 1978, 1980 and
1982 as the LFS was not conducted in these years).  In order to
increase the sample size (and hence the precision of our estimates) the
actual earnings distributions is computed using two pooled years of the
General Household Survey and the year given in Figure 8 refers to the
second of the two years6.  Everything is measured relative to labour
market entrants (as we have nothing which explains the level of their
earnings) so the predicted and actual are constrained to coincide for
labour market entrants.  The overall impression is how much of the
rise in earnings is explained by the pure search model.  Particularly
striking is the fact that the pure search model traces out the ‘bump’ in
the profile for women which it predicts is the result of women leaving
paid employment to have and bring up children.  One might wonder
about the precision of these estimates.  Appendix B describes how we
computed the standard error for the predicted wages.  Typically the
standard error for the estimate of the actual wage is  in the range of
0.04 to 0.06 and the standard error for the predicted wage starts off
around 0.06 and then rises to a maximum of 0.1 (some actual estimates
are reported in Table 2).     
Although the overall fit is quite good, there are still substantial
residuals in certain parts of the profile which should be interpreted as
the ‘true’ returns to experience.  These rise very sharply in the early
part of the worker’s career but then decline gradually actually ending
up negative implying that the oldest workers have a level of human
capital below that of labour market entrants.
To provide a better idea of the contribution of the search
component and the residual to earnings growth, Tables 2a and 2b
present estimates of the actual gain, the predicted gain and the residual
19
at different years of experience over the sample period together with
the computed standard errors.  Even at 5 years of experience the search
model explains at least 40% of the earnings gains.  We can also use the
information in this table to examine the hypothesis of an increase in the
‘true’ returns to experience.  In the conventional analysis the actual
returns are used which, as we saw earlier in Table 1 and can be seen
again here, did seem to rise in the early 1980s.  But with our
decomposition we want to look at the residuals.  These do seem to rise
in the early 1980s (which is when the search model performs worst)
but, by the early 1990s the residual seems to be back where it was in
the late 1970s.  It is in the component predicted by the search model
that the rise in the returns to experience can be found. 
One can also ask how well the search model can explain
differences in the returns to experience between men and women.
Figure 9 shows the difference in earnings at different experience levels
and the predictions of the pure search model (the decomposition is
constructed so the actual and predicted coincide at zero experience).
What is striking is that virtually all the differences can be explained by
the search model i.e. by differences in transition rates.  This also
suggests that the reason for the narrowing of the earnings gap between
men and women is largely, if not wholly, the result of the narrowing in
transition rates that we saw earlier.  Note that this is not saying that the
model can explain earnings differences between men and women on
labour market entry but, as noted earlier, these disappeared in the mid-
1970s so that the difference in the returns to experience is now
virtually all of the gender pay gap.
4. FURTHER RESULTS: DIFFERENT EDUCATION
GROUPS
So far, we have lumped all education groups together.  In this section
we look at different levels of education.  Because of the need to have
consistency over time we divide into three levels of education: those
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who left full-time education at age 16 or before, those who left after 16
but before 21 and those who left at 21 or later (the Labour Force
Survey has no information on qualifications until 1979).  We will refer
to these education groups as low, medium and high respectively.  For
all of the sample period there are relatively small number of
observations in the GHS in the medium and high groups respectively.
So, we group 6 years together, making three periods which we will
refer to as early (1974S79 inclusive), middle (1980S85) and late
(1986S92).  With separate results for men and women this leads to the
six figures which are in Figures 10aS10f.
The main differences in the profiles across education groups is
that the profile seems to be flattest for the medium education group and
steepest for the lowest education group.  In terms of the prediction of
the search model one can see that the model does worst in the early
1980s for all education groups (as we saw before) but that the search
model does better at explaining the profile the higher the education
level.  For the highest education group, the search model seems to do
an amazingly good job in fitting the actual profile.  This difference in
fit across education groups is largely because of the differences in the
shape of the profiles rather than because of differences in the
predictions of the search model.                    
What possible explanation for this is there?  One interpretation
might be that the higher the age at which an individual leaves full-time
education, the less of their human capital is provided at work.  For
many of the workers who left education early, what skills and
qualifications they have achieved will often have been achieved while
in work (e.g. apprenticeships).  However it is much rarer, for example,
for university graduates to attain further qualifications once they are in
employment.  If this is correct, our results are consistent with the fact
that human capital does increase rapidly in the first years after labour
market entry for those workers who left school at the earliest
opportunity.
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Var(w*a) ' mw(F,a)2dG(F*a)& mw(F,a)dG(F*a)
2
(11)
mw(F,0)2dG(F*a)& mw(F,0)dG(F*a)
2
(12)
5. THE ACTUAL AND PREDICTED VARIANCE PROFILE
So far we have concentrated on how well the search model can explain
the variation in the first moment of the wage distribution with
experience as this is the aspect of the earnings-experience profile that
is most commonly explained.  But, as already mentioned, one could
apply the same methodology to trying to explain other aspects of the
wage distribution and doing so might be expected to give further insight
into the adequacy of the search model.  So, in this section, we look at
the actual and predicted variance of earnings.  The actual variance can
obviously be written as:
The  variance predicted by the pure search model, on the other hand,
will be given by:
The difference between the two (the residual) does not have as simple
an expression as is the case for the mean so is not written here.  Figure
11 presents the actual and predicted variance-experience profiles for
our year.  There seem to be no particularly striking differences between
men and women. The actual profile also does not seem to vary greatly
with experience though there is some evidence of a fall in the first years
after labour market entry.  This contrasts with the findings of Dickens
(1996) who, using a different data set, found that the variance of
earnings is first increasing and then constant over the life-cycle.  There
are a number of  possible explanations for the differences.  First,
Dickens restricts attention to those aged 22S59 so misses the first 6
years of the labour market for those who left education at the earliest
opportunity.  Secondly, Dickens uses age alone as the experience
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variable as there is no information on education in his data set.  This
does appear to make some difference: if we draw the profile in our data
using age as the experience variable there is some slight increase over
the life-cycle after an initial dip though it is not as large as in Dickens’
study.  The intuition for this is the following: university graduates
entering the labour market at the age of 21 do so at wages quite similar
to those who have been in the labour market since the age of 18 so the
variance at age 21 is quite low.  But the graduates rapidly overtake the
earnings of the less-educated group and the variance rises.  But, if one
conditions on experience this does not occur as people of all education
groups have rapid earnings increases on entry into the labour market
(though some more than others S see previous section).
Turning to the predicted variance, there overall predicted variance
is pretty close to the actual though there are a number of years in which
the predicted variance is substantially above the actual .  The predicted
variance tends to have a shallow u-shape for men but a slightly more
complicated shape for women.  Overall, the pure search model does
not do too badly in explaining the variance profile.  This is consistent
with a model in which we can write w(F,a)=w(F)+?(a) in which case
the search model will accurately pick up movements in the variance
profile over the life-cycle even if there are substantial ‘true’ returns to
experience.
6. EXTENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS
One should be aware of certain assumptions in our simple search model
that may make it appear to perform better or worse than really does so
let us consider likely sources of bias.  First, our assumption that jobs
never change their position in the wage offer distribution means that
job mobility is probably given an exaggerated role in wage growth
(though it is unclear whether the model would perform better or worse
with some within-job wage mobility as jobs will go up as well as down
the wage offer distribution).  Secondly, the assumption that workers
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wi0 ' ?i % ?i0 % ei0 (13)
only care about wages mean that the ‘only way is up’: if workers also
care about non-wage attributes then some job-to-job mobility will
mean workers move down the wage offer distribution S this effect will
tend to reduce the prediction of  earnings growth in the search model
and, given that the main weakness of the search model is its inability to
predict very rapid earnings growth in the earliest years,  make it fit the
data worse.  Going in a similar direction is the fact that any ‘noise’ in
the wage distribution of labour market entrants e.g. because of
unmeasured worker heterogeneity or measurement error will tend to
increase the search model’s prediction for wage growth as variance in
the wage offer distribution is exploited by the process of job mobility.
As this is an issue of some importance, let us consider how we
might try to get some idea of the potential problems caused by it.  The
discussion that follows should be interpreted broadly as it involves a
number of approximations.   Suppose that we can write the log wage
of labour market entrant I as:
where ?i  is a fixed effect, ?i0 is measurement error and ei0 measures the
position in the wage offer distribution of the job that the worker has.
In this set-up the distribution of e can be exploited by the individual in
the process of job search but the individual heterogeneity and the
measurement error cannot be.  Suppose that each of the individual
components of (13) is independently normally distributed with mean
µw for the first component and mean zero for the others (this is without
loss of generality) and standard deviations (s ?,s ?,s e) respectively.
These assumptions mean that the overall log wage distribution for
labour market entrants will be normal as well, an assumption that is not
too at variance with the facts.
Suppose that we assumed (mistakenly) that all the cross-section
variance in wages can be exploited by  the process of job search.  An
alternative way of representing the wage distribution for labour market
entrants in (13) is:
24
w(F,0) ' µw % s wF
&1(F) (14)
mw(F,0)dG(F,a) & mw(F,0)dF ' s wmF &1(F)dG(F,a) (15)
w(F?,F?,Fe,0) ' µw % s ?F
&1(F?) % s ?F
&1(F?) % s eF
&1(Fe) (16)
mw(F,0)dG(F,a) & mw(F,0)dF ' s emF &1(Fe)dG(Fe,a) (17)
where µw  is the mean of the wage distribution for entrants,  s w is the
standard deviation,  F -1(F) is the inverse of the distribution function for
the standard normal and F the position of the individual in the overall
wage distribution.
The wage growth predicted by the search model is then given by:
Now consider the correct estimate of wage growth due to the result of
the search model.  One can  think of an individual as being
characterised by a position in the ability distribution, F?, a position in
the measurement error distribution, F?, and a position in the wage offer
distribution Fe.  The first two will always be uniformly distributed
across the population while the distribution of the latter will change
with search.  Analogously to (14), we can then write:
The first three components will not vary with experience so that the
‘true’ wage growth predicted by search will be:
Comparison of (15) with (17) shows that (conditional on the normality
assumption) there is a very simple relationship between the true returns
to experience predicted by the search model and the returns predicted
by the model which assumes that all wage variation can be exploited
through search.  One is a simple multiple of the other, the ratio being
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wi1 ' ?i % ?i1 % ei1 (18)
ei1 ' ei0 with probability 1&?e(0) %?eF
ei0
s e
' e ,e$ei0 with probability f
ei0
s e
(19)
Var(w0) ' s
2
? % s
2
? % s
2
e / s
2
w
Var(w1) ' s
2
? % s
2
? % s
2
e 1&
?e(0)
2
p
Y Var(w1)&Var(w0) '
s 2e?e(0)
2
p
(20)
given by the ratio  s e / s w i.e. the ratio of the standard deviation of the
wage offer distribution to the standard deviation of total wages.7
Now let us consider how we can get an estimate of this ratio.  If
wages for labour market entrants are given by (13) then for workers in
employment in the next year who have had no intervening period of
unemployment we will have:
where the distribution of ei1 will, from our assumed model of search,
have a very particular relationship to the distribution of  ei0, namely it
is censored at  ei0 with:
Appendix C proves certain facts about the distribution which can be
used to derive the following:
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so that knowledge of the variances of log wages for labour market
entrants at entry and one year later (for those in continuous
employment) can, together with knowledge of the job-to-job mobility
rate from transition rates, be used to get an estimate of s e. This can then
be compared with the overall variance in entrants’ wages.  Data on the
variances was obtained from the British Panel Study (as it is important
to have a sample of individuals in continuous employment) which gives
the variance at labour market entry in the early 1990s as 0.49 and one
year later as 0.42.  A reasonable value for ?e(0) is about 0.8 when (20)
then implies that s e=0.58 as compared to a value of  s w=0.7.  While
these computations have a back-of-the-envelope quality to them, this
would suggest that there our computed returns to experience as a
consequence of search are possibly not a wild over-estimate of the
truth.  So far, we have emphasized a bias in our approach which
will tend to overstate the contribution of search.  But we have also
made simplifying assumptions which will tend to worsen the
contribution of the search model.  The assumption that job arrival rates
for the employed are the same at all points in the wage offer
distribution implicitly assumes that search intensity is the same.  Yet,
we would expect search intensity to be concentrated in workers with
the worse jobs as the potential for gain is greatest there.  Embodying
this in our search model would tend to increase the predicted rate of
earnings growth.  It is also quite likely that the job destruction rate
varies with the position in the wage offer distribution as lower-paid
workers do seem to be at greater risk of job loss.  Again, this would
tend to increase the predicted rate of earnings growth in the early years
in the job search model as workers who reach the higher rungs on the
ladder are less likely to fall off.
This discussion has hinted that there are useful ways in which the
search model could be modified but it is unclear whether these changes
would make the model fit better or worse.  
7. CONCLUSIONS
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In this paper we have argued that simple search or ‘job-shopping’
model can do surprisingly well in interpreting the earnings-experience
profile.  It does extremely well in explaining differences in the profile
between men and women.  We should not be surprised by these results
as the literature on displaced workers (see, inter alia, Jacobson et al
1993, and Ruhm, 1991) suggest that losing your job leads to lower
earnings even once one has controlled for lost job tenure and the
search model simply formalizes this unsurprising fact. These results
suggest that labour economists should be much more cautious than
they commonly are in interpreting returns to experience purely as
returns to human capital: perhaps we should think of part of  it as
returns to search capital.
However, there are also dangers in exaggerating the differences
between the two views.  In the model we have presented above search
capital is destroyed completely whenever a worker loses a job while,
in contrast, human capital theory would emphasize that general human
capital would not be lost in this situation. But both views would
emphasize the importance in differences in transition rates between
men and women in accounting for the gender gap: the difference is
more in the ‘spin’ that would be put on the mechanism behind the
story.  The human capital story would emphasize that women who have
taken time out of the labour market have less human capital, hence are
less productive and receive lower wages.  The search model would
suggest they are no less productive themselves but that they are tend to
be in the less well-paid jobs (which could be less productive
employers).
There are useful extensions that could be done to the approach
used in this paper.  Earnings functions usually condition not just on
experience but also on job tenure (as well as other factors) which is
often interpreted as the returns to specific human capital so that the
wage paid should perhaps be written as w(F,a,t) where t is job tenure.
The function w(F,a) we have used here should be interpreted as being
this function after we have marginalised with respect to job tenure.  But
it would be very useful to work with job tenure included and one can
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use the approach derived in this paper to compute the predictions of a
search model for the correlation between wages experience and tenure.
We have not done this here for the reasons that it complicates matters
very considerably and that the data we have used contains only banded
information on job tenure.  But, it would be interesting to know how
well the search model does in explaining the correlations between
wages and tenure and Manning (1997) considers this extension.
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1. One might wonder about the possible dependence of wages on
tenure: we return to this issue below. 
2. However, the two theories do differ in their predictions about
what function of experience might be most useful in predicting
wages e.g. the human capital model would look for some measure
of the stock of human capital while the pure search model would
suggest that the current length of time in employment might be
more useful.  
3. It should be noted that Gosling, Machin and Meghir  (1994)
suggest that the apparent rise in the returns to experience is in fact
a cohort (i.e. birth date) effect.  It is difficult to distinguish the
two hypotheses as once one has a term in cohort squared this is
equivalent to including experience multiplied by a time trend. 
4. If the pure search model was correct then one could also use the
distribution of wages among those workers entering employment
after a period of non-employment to estimate w(F,0).  We do not
do this here as there is no particular reason to believe that the
pure search model is correct and we do not have the relevant data
for all years in the GHS.
5. Though one should note that given an estimate of G(F*a) one
could use this function and the distribution of wages across
workers to provide an estimate of w(F,a).
6. This corresponds, approximately, to the fact that the Labour
Force Survey, taken in the spring of the year refers to transitions
since the previous spring. 
7. I am grateful to Coen Teulings for drawing my attention to the
possibility of doing this.
ENDNOTES
TABLE 1:  The Changing Returns to Experience
Men Women
6S10 11S15 16S25 26S35 36S45 6S10 11S15 16S25 26S35 36S45
1974 0.44
(0.02)
0.53
(0.02)
0.56
(0.02)
0.56
(0.02)
0.45
(0.02)
0.29
(0.03)
0.19
(0.03)
0.17
(0.02)
 0.13
(0.02)
 0.08
(0.02)
1975 0.41
(0.02)
0.49
(0.02)
0.54
(0.02)
0.50
(0.02)
0.44
(0.02)
0.20
(0.02)
0.13
(0.02)
0.12
(0.02)
 0.11
(0.02)
 0.05
(0.02)
1976 0.43
(0.02)
0.49
(0.02)
0.53
(0.02)
0.52
(0.02)
0.43
(0.02)
0.23
(0.02)
 0.14
(0.02)
 0.13
(0.02)
0.12
(0.02)
0.08
(0.02)
1977 0.44
(0.02)
0.53
(0.02)
0.57
(0.02)
0.55
(0.02)
0.43
(0.02)
0.29
(0.02)
 0.20
(0.02)
 0.16
(0.02)
 0.18
(0.02)
0.12
(0.02)
1978 0.42
(0.02)
0.49
(0.02)
0.56
(0.02)
0.52
(0.02)
0.40
(0.02)
0.27
(0.02)
 0.26
(0.02)
0.15
(0.02)
 0.17
(0.02)
 0.09
(0.02)
1979 0.43
(0.02)
0.49
(0.02)
0.52
(0.02)
0.52
(0.02)
0.41
(0.02)
0.27
(0.02)
 0.18
(0.02)
 0.14
(0.02)
 0.13
(0.02)
 0.09
(0.02)
1980 0.46
(0.02)
0.50
(0.02)
0.57
(0.02)
0.56
(0.02)
0.44
(0.02)
0.29
(0.02)
 0.20
(0.02)
 0.11
(0.02)
 0.15
(0.02)
 0.06
(0.02)
1981 0.49
(0.02)
0.59
(0.02)
0.61
(0.02)
0.57
(0.02)
0.51
(0.02)
0.29
(0.02)
 0.23
(0.03)
 0.11
(0.02)
 0.10
(0.02)
 0.07
(0.02)
1982 0.45
(0.02)
0.62
(0.02)
0.61
(0.03)
0.62
(0.02)
0.46
(0.02)
0.34
(0.03)
 0.23
(0.03)
 0.16
(0.02)
 0.14
(0.02)
 0.06
(0.02)
1983 0.42
(0.02)
0.56
(0.03)
0.56
(0.02)
0.54
(0.02)
0.47
(0.02)
0.34
(0.03)
 0.30
(0.03)
 0.17
(0.02)
 0.14
(0.02)
 0.09
(0.02)
1984 0.51
(0.03)
0.66
(0.03)
0.67
(0.02)
0.65
(0.02)
0.57
(0.03)
0.39
(0.03)
 0.34
(0.03)
 0.24
(0.02)
 0.21
(0.02)
 0.17
(0.03)
1985 0.54
(0.02)
0.67
(0.03)
0.72
(0.03)
0.71
(0.02)
0.62
(0.03)
0.32
(0.03)
 0.36
(0.03)
 0.23
(0.02)
 0.15
(0.02)
 0.13
(0.03)
1986 0.56
(0.03)
0.67
(0.03)
0.73
(0.02)
0.71
(0.02)
0.59
(0.03)
0.35
(0.03)
 0.38
(0.03)
 0.26
(0.02)
 0.22
(0.02)
 0.13
(0.03)
1987 0.50
(0.03)
0.65
(0.03)
0.71
(0.02)
0.70
(0.02)
0.61
(0.03)
0.33
(0.03)
 0.31
(0.03)
 0.26
(0.02)
 0.20
(0.02)
 0.12
(0.03)
1988 0.49
(0.03)
0.63
(0.03)
0.75
(0.02)
0.68
(0.03)
0.57
(0.03)
0.32
(0.03)
 0.26
(0.03)
 0.34
(0.02)
 0.15
(0.02)
 0.13
(0.03)
1989 0.53
(0.03)
0.65
(0.03)
0.74
(0.02)
0.69
(0.02)
0.61
(0.03)
0.30
(0.03)
 0.32
(0.03)
 0.25
(0.02)
 0.18
(0.02)
 0.11
(0.03)
1990 0.53
(0.03)
0.63
(0.03)
0.68
(0.03)
0.69
(0.03)
0.60
(0.03)
0.31
(0.03)
 0.33
(0.03)
 0.28
(0.03)
 0.21
(0.03)
 0.13 
(0.03)
1991 0.49
(0.03)
0.62
(0.03)
0.71
(0.03)
0.68
(0.03)
0.56
(0.03)
0.35
(0.03)
 0.36
(0.03)
 0.27
(0.03)
 0.20
(0.03)
 0.15
(0.03)
1992 0.51
(0.03)
0.63
(0.03)
0.69
(0.03)
0.67
(0.03)
0.55
(0.03)
0.38
(0.03)
 0.31
(0.03)
 0.34
(0.03)
 0.23
(0.03)
 0.13
(0.03)
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TABLE 2a:  Actual, Predicted and Residual Returns to Experience
Women
5 year 15 year 25 year 35 year 45 year
a p r a p r a p r a p r a p r
1975 0.61
(.04) 
0.39
(.06) 
0.21
(.07) 
0.49
(.04) 
0.38
(.06) 
0.10
(.07) 
0.45
(.05) 
0.40
(.06) 
0.05
(.07) 
0.45
(.03) 
0.49
(.06) 
-0.04
(.07) 
0.43
(.04) 
0.54
(.06) 
-0.11
(.08) 
1977 0.60
(.03) 
0.30
.(05) 
0.30
(.06) 
0.52
(.05) 
0.33
(.05) 
0.18
(.07) 
0.48
(.04) 
0.37
(.05) 
0.10
(.06) 
0.48
(.04) 
0.44
(.05) 
0.04
(.06) 
0.39
(.03) 
0.47
(.05) 
-0.07
(.06) 
1979 0.57
(.03) 
0.27
(.03) 
0.30
(.04) 
0.48
(.03) 
0.28
(.03) 
0.20
(.05) 
0.43
(.04) 
0.30
(.03) 
0.13
(.05) 
0.47
(.03) 
0.37
(.04) 
0.10
(.05) 
0.35
(.03) 
0.37
(.04) 
-0.02
(.05) 
1981 0.69
(.03) 
0.20
(.04) 
0.49
(.05) 
0.52
(.05) 
0.25
(.04) 
0.27
(.07) 
0.58
(.04) 
0.33
(.05) 
0.25
(.06) 
0.52
(.04) 
0.38
(.05) 
0.14
(.06) 
0.42
(.06) 
0.40
(.05) 
0.02
(.08) 
1983 0.59
(.03) 
0.22
(.04) 
0.37
(.05) 
0.52
(.07) 
0.22
(.04) 
0.30
(.08) 
0.49
(.05) 
0.28
(.04) 
0.21
(.06) 
0.43
(.07) 
0.31
(.04) 
0.13
(.08) 
      
1984 0.70
(.03) 
0.26
(.04) 
0.43
(.06) 
0.68
(.05) 
0.25
(.04) 
0.43
(.07) 
0.58
(.05) 
0.27
(.04) 
0.31
(.06) 
0.55
(.06) 
0.31
(.04) 
0.24
(.07) 
0.54
(.05) 
0.29
(.04) 
0.26
(.07) 
1985 0.61
(.03) 
0.31
(.05) 
0.30
(.06) 
0.62
(.05) 
0.28
(.05) 
0.34
(.07) 
0.55
(.05) 
0.35
(.04) 
0.20
(.06) 
0.58
(.06) 
0.40
(.04) 
0.19
(.07) 
0.40
(.05) 
0.36
(.04) 
0.03
(.07) 
1986 0.66
(.04) 
0.34
(.05) 
0.32
(.06) 
0.72
(.06) 
0.33
(.05) 
0.39
(.08) 
0.61
(.05) 
0.37
(.05) 
0.24
(.07) 
0.64
(.06) 
0.41
(.05) 
0.23
(.08) 
0.38
(.05) 
0.38
(.05) 
-0.00
(.07) 
1987 0.66
(.04) 
0.36
(.05) 
0.30
(.06) 
0.69
(.05) 
0.37
(.05) 
0.32
(.07) 
0.54
(.05) 
0.38
(.05) 
0.16
(.07) 
0.63
(.05) 
0.46
(.06) 
0.17
(.07) 
0.48
(.09) 
0.43
(.06) 
0.06
(.10) 
1988 0.67
(.04) 
   0.39
(.05) 
0.28
(.06) 
0.86
(.08) 
0.36
(.05) 
0.50
(.09) 
0.63
(.05) 
0.39
(.05) 
0.24
(.07) 
0.63
(.05) 
0.45
(.05) 
0.18
(.07) 
0.43
(.03) 
0.38
(.05) 
0.05
(.06) 
1989 0.65
(.04) 
0.47
(.05) 
0.19
(.07) 
0.65
(.05) 
0.49
(.06) 
0.16
(.08) 
0.60
(.05) 
0.55
(.06) 
0.05
(.08) 
0.54
(.05) 
0.64
(.06) 
-0.11
(.08) 
0.41
(.05) 
0.61
(.06) 
-0.19
(.08) 
1990 0.76
(.04) 
0.46
(.05) 
0.30
(.06) 
0.66
(.05) 
0.47
(.05) 
0.18
(.07) 
0.58
(.04) 
0.53
(.06) 
0.05
(.07) 
0.63
(.05) 
0.61
(.06) 
0.02
(.08) 
0.43
(.08) 
0.57
(.06) 
-0.14
(.10) 
1991 0.57
(.05) 
0.41
(.05) 
0.16
(.07) 
0.68
(.05) 
0.49
(.05) 
0.20
(.07) 
0.65
(.06) 
0.54
(.06) 
0.11
(.08) 
0.51
(.06) 
0.61
(.08) 
-0.10
(.08) 
0.40
(.08) 
0.56
(.06) 
-0.16
(.10) 
1992 0.64
(.04) 
0.37
(.05) 
0.27
(.07) 
0.65
(.06) 
0.38
(.05) 
0.28
(.08) 
0.64
(.06) 
0.44
(.05) 
0.20
(.08) 
0.49
(.04) 
0.48
(.06) 
0.00
(.07) 
0.35
(.06) 
0.41
(.06) 
-0.06
(.08) 
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TABLE 2a
Men
5 year 15 year 25 year 35 year 45 year
a p r a p r a p r a p r a p r
1975 0.60
(.03) 
0.41
(.05) 
0.19
(.06) 
0.83
(.03) 
0.96
(.08) 
-0.13
(.08) 
0.93
(.03) 
1.18
(.10) 
-0.25
(.10) 
0.80
(.03) 
1.14
(.13) 
-0.34
(.13) 
0.72
(.03) 
1.14
(1.95) 
-0.42
(1.95) 
1977 0.86
(.03) 
0.35
(.06) 
0.51
(.06) 
1.04
(.02) 
0.85
(.08) 
0.19
(.08) 
1.08
(.03) 
1.05
(.09) 
0.03
(.09) 
1.07
(.03) 
1.11
(.09) 
-0.04
(.10) 
0.86
(.04) 
1.11
(.09) 
-0.24
(.10) 
1979 0.80
(.02) 
0.34
(.04) 
0.47
(.05) 
0.98
(.03) 
0.75
(.06) 
0.23
(.06) 
0.94
(.03) 
0.90
(.06) 
0.04
(.07) 
0.90
(.03) 
0.93
(.07) 
-0.02
(.07) 
0.75
(.03) 
0.94
(.07) 
-0.19
(.07) 
1981 0.91
(.03) 
0.24
(.05) 
0.68
(.06) 
1.17
(.03) 
0.60
(.07) 
0.56
(.07) 
1.15
(.04) 
0.79
(.08) 
0.36
(.09) 
1.15
(.04) 
0.87
(.09) 
0.28
(.10) 
1.04
(.03) 
0.91
(.07) 
0.14
(.07) 
1983 0.81
(.03) 
0.23
(.05) 
0.58
(.06) 
1.13
(.05) 
0.47
(.06) 
0.66
(.07) 
1.05
(.05) 
0.57
(.06) 
0.48
(.08) 
0.98
(.04) 
0.57
(.06) 
0.41
(.08) 
1984 0.89
(.03) 
0.27
(.05) 
0.61
(.06) 
1.21
(.04) 
0.53
(.06) 
0.68
(.07) 
1.15
(.05) 
0.62
(.06) 
0.52
(.08) 
1.10
(.05) 
0.64
(.06) 
0.46
(.08) 
0.97
(.05) 
0.57
(.06) 
0.39
(.08) 
1985 0.96
(.04) 
0.32
(.05) 
0.65
(.07) 
1.24
(.04) 
0.60
(.06) 
0.64
(.07) 
1.23
(.04) 
0.70
(.07) 
0.53
(.08) 
1.21
(.05) 
0.74
(.07) 
0.47
(.09) 
1.10
(.06) 
0.72
(.07) 
0.39
(.09) 
1986 1.01
(.04) 
0.30
(.05) 
0.70
(.07) 
1.24
(.03) 
0.60
(.06) 
0.65
(.07) 
1.27
(.04) 
0.71
(.07) 
0.56
(.08) 
1.29
(.05) 
0.76
(.07) 
0.54
(.08) 
1.02
(.05) 
0.71
(.07) 
0.31
(.08) 
1987 0.90
(.04) 
0.31
(.05) 
0.58
(.06) 
1.23
(.04) 
0.61
(.05) 
0.62
(.07) 
1.20
(.04) 
0.69
(.06) 
0.51
(.07) 
1.18
(.05) 
0.73
(.06) 
0.45
(.08) 
1.05
(.06) 
0.70
(.06) 
0.34
(.09) 
1988 0.91
(.04) 
0.37
(.05) 
0.54
(.07) 
1.32
(.05) 
0.61
(.07) 
0.72
(.08) 
1.30
(.05) 
0.64
(.07) 
0.66
(.08) 
1.16
(.06) 
0.67
(.07) 
0.49
(.09) 
1.06
(.05) 
0.62
(.07) 
0.44
(.09) 
1989 0.93
(.04) 
0.40
(.05) 
0.52
(.06) 
1.24
(.04) 
0.73
(.06) 
0.51
(.07) 
1.26
(.05) 
0.83
(.07) 
0.42
(.09) 
1.18
(.06) 
0.88
(.07) 
0.29
(.09) 
1.06
(.05) 
0.83
(.07) 
0.23
(.09) 
1990 0.85
(.05) 
0.39
(.06) 
0.47
(.08) 
1.07
(.04) 
0.69
(.08) 
0.38
(.09) 
1.10
(.05) 
0.79
(.09) 
0.31
(.11) 
1.08
(.06) 
0.80
(.10) 
0.28
(.11) 
0.92
(.08) 
 0.79
(.09) 
0.13
(.12) 
1991 0.86
(.04) 
0.39
(.07) 
0.47
(.08) 
1.13
(.04) 
0.78
(.09) 
0.35
(.10) 
1.10
(.06) 
0.89
(.10) 
0.21
(.12) 
1.13
(.06) 
0.93
(.10) 
0.20
(.12) 
0.86
(.06) 
0.90
(.10) 
-0.04
(.12) 
1992 0.83
(.04) 
0.31
(.06) 
0.52
(.07) 
1.13
(.04) 
0.58
(.07) 
0.55
(.08) 
1.15
(.05) 
0.66
(.08) 
0.49
(.09) 
1.00
(.06) 
0.71
(.08) 
0.29
(.10) 
0.79
(.07) 
0.68
(.08) 
0.11
(.11) 
Notes:
1. A is the actual average wage, p is the predicted and r the residual.  Standard errors computed by
the method described in Appendix B are reported in parentheses.
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MJ(F*a)
Ma
' &[du%?e(1&F)].J(F*a) % ?u.F.u(a) (21)
MG(F*a)
Ma
'
0u(a)
1&u(a)
G(F*a) % 1
1&u(a)
MJ(F*a)
Ma
(22)
M[G(F*a)&F]
Ma
' &Fß(a) & [a(a)%ß(a)][G(F*a)&F] (23)
M([G(F*a)&F].e
m
a
0
[a(s)%ß(s)]ds
)
Ma
' &Fß(a)e
m
a
0
[a(s)%ß(s)]ds (24)
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote by J(F*a) the proportion of the population of experience a that
is in a firm of position F or less.  Obviously [1-u(a)]G(F*a)=J(F*a) so
that knowledge of J(.) and (4) allows us to derive G(.).  
The derivative of J(F*a) with respect to a will be equal to the
inflow to this group minus the outflow. As the instantaneous separation
rate is [du (a)+?e (a)(1-F)] the outflow will be given by [du (a)+?e (a)(1-
F)]J(F*a).  The inflow comes from those workers who are unemployed
who get a wage offer that is less than F.  The rate at which this happens
is ?u(a)Fu(a).
Putting this information together we have that:
Now, as (1-u)G=J we have that:
which, using (3) and (21) can be re-arranged to yield (4).
To derive the closed-form solution note that given the definitions
of (a,ß,G) one can write the differential equation (4) as:
which can be written as:
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M [G(F*a)&F].G(a)
Ma
' &Fß(a)G(a) (25)
MG(s)
Ma(v)
'
MG(s)
Mß(v)
' 0 if v>s
MG(s)
Ma(v)
'
MG(s)
Mß(v)
' G(s) if v#s
(26)
MG(F*a)
Ma(v)
'
&F
G(a)2
. G(a)m
a
v
G(s)ß(s)ds & G(a)m
a
0
G(s)ß(s)ds > 0 (27)
MG(F*a)
Mß(v)
'
&F
G(a)2
. G(a)m
a
v
G(s)ß(s)ds % G(a)G(v) & G(a)m
a
0
G(s)ß(s)ds
'
&F
G(a)
. G(v) & m
v
0
G(s)ß(s)ds
(28)
which, given the definition of G can be written as:
Which, together with the initial condition G(F*0)=F leads to (5).
Proof of Proposition 2
As a preliminary, note from (6) that:
By inspection of the formula in (5) we can see that a(v) and ß(v) have
no effect on G(F*a) if v$a.  So, let us restrict attention to v<a.  Then by
differentiating (5) we have (making extensive use of (26)).:
and:
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M G(v)&m
v
0
G(s)ß(s)ds
Mv
' [a(v)%ß(v)]G(v) & ß(v)G(v) > 0
(29)
MG(F*a)
Ma
'
&F
G(a)2
. G(a)2ß(a) & [a(a)%ß(a)]G(a)m
a
0
G(s)ß(s)ds
'
F
G(a)
. [a(a)%ß(a)]m
a
0
G(s)ß(s)ds&G(a)ß(a)
(30)
Let us consider the term in the large brackets in the final line.  When
v=0 this is strictly positive  as G(0)=1.  Taking the derivative of it with
respect to v we have that:
so that the term is increasing in v.  Hence it must always be strictly
positive making the expression in the last line of (28) as a whole
negative.
Proof of Proposition 3
If we differentiate (5) with respect to a we obtain:
Let us define the term in the large brackets in the last line of (30) as
Z(a).  It is the sign of Z(a) which determines the sign of the derivative
of G with respect to a.  Obviously Z(0)<0 (which is simply our earlier
result that initially the wage distribution must improve).  So if we can
show that Z’(a)#0 then we have proved the result.  Differentiating Z(a)
we have:
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Z )(a) ' [a )%ß)]m
a
0
G(s)ß(s)ds % [a%ß]Gß & ß)G & ßG)
' [a )%ß)]m
a
0
G(s)ß(s)ds & ß)G
'
a )%ß)
a%ß
Z(a) % a
)ß&ß)a
a%ß
G(a)
(31)
where the second line follows from the fact that G’=(a+ß)G and the
final line from (30).  As Z(0)<0 if Z(a)>0 for some a it must cross the
axis from below.  But if Z(a)=0, the final line shows that, under the
conditions stated in the Proposition,  Z’(a)#0 so this is not possible.
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?u '
Lne
Lne%Lnn
, du '
Len
Lee%Len
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APPENDIX B
The Discrete Time Version of the Model
There are two types of discretization that we are going to do to
implement the theoretical model.  First, we are going to model time in
discrete periods (a year) and, secondly (for computational reasons) we
can only consider a finite number of values of F.  Let us start with
considering the implications of discrete time.
 In the discretized version of the model we assume that workers get
at most one job offer per year or get their job destroyed once so that
(?u,du,?e) now refer to probabilities and hence must be less than one.
For each cell (differentiated by year, sex, experience and,
possibly, education) we have an estimate of the number of people in
each of the cells (employed, employed), (non-employed, employed),
(employed, non-employed) and (non-employed, non-employed) where
the first state refers to the situation a year ago and the second refers to
the situation now.  Obviously these numbers enable us to compute the
non-employment rate for this experience group both now (which we
will denote by u(a)) and a year ago (which we will denote by u(a-1)).
Let us denote by Lne the number of individuals non-employed a year
ago but employed now with similar notation for the other four states
and use L to denote the total sample size.  Then our estimates of (?u,du)
are given by:
Now consider how we can work out ?e, the arrival rate of job offers
when employed.  For those workers who are in employment in both
years we have information on whether they have changed employers or
not.  Denote by ?(a) the proportion of these workers who have changed
jobs.  So the probability of worker in employment a year ago changing
jobs but being in employment in both years is given by [1-du(a)]?(a).
If the distribution of workers with experience a is given by G(F*a-1)
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[1&du(a)]?(a) ' ?e(a)m
1
0
(1&F)dG(F*a&1) (33)
J(F*a) ' [1&du(a)&?e(a)(1&F)][1&u(a&1)]G(F*a&1) % F?u(a)u(a&1) (34)
G(F*a) ' [1&du(a)] 1&
?(a)(1&F)
m
1
0
(1&F ))dG(F )*a&1)
[1&u(a&1)]
[1&u(a)]
G(F*a&1) % F
?u(a)u(a&1)
[1&u(a)]
(35)
?u(a).u(a&1)
[1&u(a)]
'
Lne
Lne%Lnn
.
Lnn%Lne
L
. L
Lne%Lee
'
Lne
Lne%Lee (37)
[1&du(a)][1&u(a&1)]
[1&u(a)]
'
Lee
Lee%Len
.
Len%Lee
L
. L
Lne%Lee
'
Lee
Lne%Lee (36)
then it must be the case that:
as only a fraction (1-F) of job offers result in a change of employers.
(33) shows that knowledge of ?(a) and G(F*a-1) is enough to enable
computation of ?e(a).  But how can we compute G(F*a-1)?  As in the
proof used in Proposition 1 let us denote by J(F *a) the percentage of the
labour force employed at a firm less than or equal to F.  In the discrete
version of (21) we have:
from which we can derive G(F*a) by [1-u(a)]G(F*a)=J(F*a).
Substituting (32) into this we have that:
Now using (32) and the definition of the unemployment rates we have
that:
so that (35) can be written as:
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G(F*a) ' s(a). 1& ?(a)(1&F)
m
1
0
(1&F ))dG(F )*a&1)
G(F*a&1) % [1&s(a)]F
(38)
m
1
0
(1&F)dG(F*a&1) ' j
100
i'1
Fi[G(Fi*a&1)&G(Fi&1*a&1)] (39)
where s(a)=Lee/(Lne+Lee) which has the natural interpretation as the
proportion of current workers who have not entered from non-
employment in the past year.
Equation (38) has a recursive structure and we can start it off
from the assumption that G(F*0)=F and then run it forward.
An additional difficulty from the computational point of view is
the need to evaluate G(F*a)  at a finite number of points  of F.  We
used one hundred values of F evenly spaced from 0.005 to 0.995 (so
effectively we use percentiles).  The integral in (36) is then
approximated by:
where Fi  denotes the value of F at the ith point in the partition and we
adopt the notation that F0 =0.  Experimentation showed that not much
was gained from moving to a finer partition. 
We also use the same percentiles when computing the wage
distribution.  We do this in the following way.  All workers in the
relevant cell are ordered by their wage and then assigned a position in
the wage distribution from 0 to 1.  We then estimate the wage at
position Fi by linear interpolation using the two wages adjacent to this
point.  The outcome of this procedure is an estimate of w(Fi) in each
cell.  We use this distribution for computing all statistics in the paper
so that the mean wage we use is (Sw(Fi))/100 and so on.  There is
obviously an approximation error in doing this but it seems to be small.
For example, the correlation across all cells in all years of the true
mean wage and the mean computed from the discretized version is 0.99
40
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2
s(a)
MG(a)
Ms(a)
MG(a)
Ms(a)
)
% s 2?(a)
MG(a)
M?(a)
MG(a)
M?(a)
)
%
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MG(a&1)
SG(a&1)
MG(a)
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(40)
and for the variance it is 0.97 (note that the variance computed from
the discretized version must always be smaller than the true variation
because the discretized model effectively assumes there is no wage
variation within percentiles).
Computing covariances
In computing the covariance matrices below it is important to be aware
of the independence assumptions we are making.  We will assume that
the information on wages is independent of that on transition rates
(they do come from different data sets) and that data on transition rates
and wages for different experience levels are independent of each other.
Given the finite number of values of F considered we can
represent G(F*a) as a vector G(a).  Let us denote the asymptotic
covariance matrix of this vector as SG(a).  As G(0)=F we must have
SG(0)=0.  As we can see from (36) G(a) is a function of G(a-1) and the
scalars s(a) and ?(a).  s(a) and ?(a) are Bernouilli random variables with
the variance of s(a) given by s(a)(1-s(a)) divided by the sample size and
similarly for ?(a).  Let us denote the variance of s(a) and ?(a) by s 2s(a)
and s 2?(a) respectively. s and ? are independent because s is the
fraction of current workers who were employed last year and ? is the
fraction of workers employed in both years who have changed jobs.
Then, from (39), the asymptotic covariance matrix is going to follow
the following recursive formula:
which can be computed using the initial condition SG(0)=0.
When we compute the expected wage from the search model
using the decomposition in (10) we obviously need the covariance
matrix for w(F,0).  We compute this in the following way.  When we
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Cov(wi,wj) '
Fi(1&Fj)
Nf(wi)f(wj)
i#j (41)
j wi(G i&Gi&1) ' w )AG (42)
Var(j wi(G i&Gi&1)) ' (w )A)Sw(w )A)) % (AG))SG(AG) (43)
discretize, the function w(F,0) is represented by the vector w (which is
of the same dimension as G).  As each element in this vector represents
percentiles of the wage distribution  there is a well-known formula for
the covariance matrix for w which we will denote by Sw and whose
individual elements are given by:
where f is the value of the density at w and N is the sample size.  In
computing this the only problem is to estimate the density.  We have
proceeded by assuming that the distribution of entry wages is normal
(an assumption that is accepted using standard normality tests for most
though not all of the years) and computed the density at different
percentiles accordingly. 
When we apply the decomposition in (10) we calculate:
where A is a square matrix of the same dimension as the rows of w and
G, with zeroes everywhere except ones on the main diagonal and -1 on
the diagonal immediately to the left of the main one.  Given this we can
compute:
and it is this that is reported in the text.
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E(?1*?0) ' [1&? % ?F (?0)]?0 % ?m
?0
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' [1&? % ?F (?0)]?0 % ?f (?0)
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E(?1) ' ?mF (?)?f (?)d? % ?mf (?)2d?
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?
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APPENDIX C
Justifying Equation (20)
It is simpler to derive (20) using a standardised normal so let us define
?=e/s e.  For economy of notation let us denote ?e(0) by ?.  Given the
assumption on the distribution of e1   in (19) we have that:
using well-known results on the censored normal distribution.  Taking
the distribution of (44) with respect to ?0, we obtain:
where the second line follows from the first as -?f (?)=f ’(?) for the
normal distribution, the third line follows from the second by
integrating by parts.
We must also have:
43
E(?21*?0) ' [1&? % ?F (?0)]?
2
0 % ?m
?0
?2f (?)d?
' [1&? % ?F (?0)]?0 % ?[1&F (?0)]
(46)
E(?21) ' (1&?)?mF (?)?2f (?)d? % ?m[1&F (?)]f (?)d?
' (1&?)&?mF (?)?f )(?)d? &
?
2m[1&F (?)]
2)d?
' (1&?) % ?m[F (?) % ?f (?)]f (?)d? %
?
2
' (1&?) % ?
2mF (?)
2)d? % ?
2
' 1
(47)
Taking the expectation of (46) with respect to  ?0, we obtain:
where the third line follows from the second by integrating by parts.
Combining (45) and (47) and the relationship between ? and e yields
(20).  
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Figure 1
The Earnings-Experience Profile in 1983
Figure 2
The Earnings-Experience Profile in All Years
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Figure 3
Changes in the Returns to Experience Over Time
Figure 4
Transition Rates From Employment to Non-Employment
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Figure 5
Transition Rates from Non-Employment to Employment
Figure 6
Job-to-Job Mobility Rates
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Figure 7
The Predictions of the Search Model for the Proportion Paid Below the
Median
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Figure 8
Actual and Predicted Earnings-Experience Profiles 
Women
Men
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Figure 9
Actual and Predicted Male-Female Wage Differential
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Figure 10a
Actual and Predicted Earnings-Experience Profiles by Education: 1974S79
Women
Men
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Figure 10b
Actual and Predicted Earnings-Experience Profiles by Education: 1980S85
Women
Men
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Figure 10c
Actual and Predicted Earnings-Experience Profiles by Education: 1986-92
Women
Men
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Figure 11a
Actual and Predicted Variance of Log Wages
Women
Men
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